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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This study examines racial desegregation efforts made by the Boston Housing 
Authority during the 1970s and 1980s in order to identify policies that housing agencies 
in the United States can implement to desegregate tenant populations. Investigating 
desegregation at BHA offers a unique opportunity as it occurred almost simultaneously 
with the well-documented desegregation of the city’s public schools. Central to both is 
the question of how local agencies respond to mandates from the federal government that 
are vaguely described and severely underfunded. Further, when it comes to civil rights 
and racial segregation, is it enough for agencies to ensure equal access or should a more 
aggressive approach be taken? For BPS, the response was inaction to the point of forced 
intervention followed by intense protest. The response from BHA was much different. As 
documented in the BHA archives, the housing authority was in close contact with the 
federal government, as well as with tenants themselves. Although the process occurred in 
fits and starts, effective policy and funding control from the federal government ensured 
BHA’s attention, and formalized venues for conversation between BHA and its tenants 
ensured input in policy decisions. Ultimately, the agency was not able to entirely avoid 
the violence that plagued BPS desegregation or achieve the goal of total desegregation; 
but considering larger demographic trends and funding issues, the outcomes have to be 
considered as positive. Effective enforcement tools from the federal government and the 
formalized input from tenants are likely the key policy choices that made the difference.
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
In 2015, the Supreme Court handed down a ruling in which the Houston Housing 
Authority was found to have constructed affordable housing units overwhelmingly in 
minority neighborhoods, and further, that this practice had resulted in the racial 
segregation of the agency’s tenants. Although most Americans likely think of racial 
segregation and government desegregation programs as something that happened back 
during the Civil Rights Era, the Houston case illustrates that these are issues still grappled 
with today. What advice then should policy analysts give to the Houston Housing 
Authority and any other housing authority that finds itself in a similar situation? Are there 
any previous desegregation efforts made by a public housing authority that offer lessons? 
This thesis examines the desegregation program undertaken by the Boston Housing 
Authority during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In doing so, I hope to identify policies 
and procedures that United States housing authorities can use going forward. 
The desegregation effort of the BHA offers a unique opportunity for studying 
government led desegregation efforts because it occurred almost simultaneously with the 
desegregation of Boston’s public school system. Boston public school desegregation is 
vividly remembered for the shocking wave of violence and protest it sparked across the 
city. This sets a compelling backdrop for an examination of BHA desegregation, because 
it might be assumed that the two desegregation programs would have resulted in similar 
reactions: both BHA and BPS desegregation involved the same population of people; 
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both occurred during roughly the same time period; both involved allocating scarce 
governmental resources; both impacted primarily low income residents; both centered 
around the sacred Bostonian neighborhood unit; and both, it was thought, could only be 
solved through direct government intervention. However, while the events surrounding 
BPS are now considered one of the defining issues of late 20th century Boston, BHA 
desegregation has been almost forgotten. Is there a policy lesson to be taken from the 
entirely different recollections the public has of these two programs?  
The evidence and history of Boston’s public housing desegregation efforts 
suggest four possible hypotheses to explain the important differences in the reactions to 
desegregating the city’s schools as opposed to housing. They are: 1) Implementation of 
public housing desegregation was better designed and more smoothly carried out. 2) 
Public housing desegregation resulted in less of the widespread violence and protests that 
became a defining feature of school desegregation. 3) The Boston Housing Authority’s 
public housing desegregation efforts did not actually result in integrated developments. 4) 
Bostonians simply did not care about public housing in the same way they cared about 
public schools. A combination of these factors could also be true as they are not mutually 
exclusive. In order to understand the reactions to housing desegregation I will review: 1) 
the history of American public housing and the condition of public housing in the 1970s; 
2) theories about American public housing and desegregation; and 3) what Boston and 
BHA’s particular situation were and how the city carried out its desegregation efforts. 
Two broad themes arise repeatedly in the comparison between BHA and BPS. 
The first is the issue of what happens when local agencies are directed via broad 
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mandates from the Federal Government. The second is the question of what exactly 
agencies should do to address segregation. Taken in combination, agencies in this 
situation have a difficult task; although they are given explicit instructions that problems 
must be addressed, the problems themselves are left undefined, tools for addressing them 
are not provided, and funding is almost entirely nonexistent. How should agencies define 
segregation? What exactly constitutes an undue racial concentration? What programs 
should agencies institute to achieve integration? Is it enough to ensure equal access, or 
should agencies take an active role in moving and placing people? Agencies like BHA 
and BPS have stepped into this void and filled in the blanks. The differing approaches of 
BHA and BPS provides just two examples of how local school and housing agencies 
have responded to these mandates, and these two approaches provide two lessons to the 
Houston Housing Authority as to how to address the issue of desegregation. 
 
 
 Chapter 2 
Methods 
 
 
 
 
 This thesis will primarily examine the desegregation efforts made at the Boston 
Housing Authority beginning in the mid 1970s and continuing through the mid 1980s. In 
order to make a comparison to the simultaneous school desegregation, a discussion of 
that program will be included; however, it will be brief as the topic has already been 
covered in detail, including by Richard Formisano’s Boston against Busing,1 cited often 
within this thesis. The focus will instead be on the much less researched BHA program.  
 The BHA Archives, housed within the larger City of Boston Archives, are the 
source of primary research for this thesis. To date, the BHA Archives offer a never before 
examined set of documents that paint a picture of not just the general administration of 
BHA at the time, but of the larger racial tensions embroiling the city during 
desegregation. Documents include letters from tenants to BHA administration, letters 
from BHA administration to tenants, internal memos, annual reports, and special reports 
conducted by the housing authority, and by others. Although the materials in the archives 
are generally comprehensive, including things such as hand written notes, they are 
especially comprehensive in the period after 1979 when BHA was put into court ordered 
receivership and required to make detailed reports back to the court on a regular basis. 
BHA archival documents are supplemented with newspaper articles of the time, mostly 
                                                
1 Ronald P. Formisano, Boston against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). 
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from the Boston Globe and the Boston Herald. I also rely on Jane Roessner’s A Decent 
Place to Live.2 Although it is primarily focused on the Columbia Point (later called 
Harbor Point) development in Boston’s Dorchester neighborhood, it is one of the only 
major works covering public housing in Boston during the end of the last century, and 
includes extensive interviews with BHA tenants and staff. 
 
                                                
2 Jane Roessner, A Decent Place to Live: From Columbia Point to Harbor Point -- A Community 
History (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2000). 
 Chapter 3 
Boston Demographics from World War Two to the 1970s 
 
 
 
 
 As the issue of public housing is largely about where people live, I include a brief 
analysis of the larger migrant and residential trends impacting Boston and the United 
States in the period leading up to and continuing through the housing authority’s 
desegregation effort (roughly 1974-1990). Beginning during World War II, Boston went 
through a major demographic shift that had a huge impact on both school and public 
housing desegregation. To a large extent, the population changes within the city during 
this period reflect similar demographic changes that occurred throughout the United 
States as southern African-Americans moved into northern cities at the same time as 
white households increasingly moved into nearby suburbs. Nationally, this migration 
resulted in neighborhoods that were increasingly both racially and economically 
segregated. This pattern was strengthened by government agencies with rules and 
practices that were both explicitly race-based, as well as those that had unintentional 
race-based outcomes (discussed in more depth below). All of this was especially 
pronounced in Boston due to the truncated geographic footprint of the city within the 
larger metropolitan area which made it easier for white households to live in segregated 
suburbs while still enjoying the benefits of proximity to a major metropolitan downtown.3 
                                                
3 Formisano, Boston against Busing, 13. 
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 During and after World War II, population demographics experienced a major 
shift, generally called the Great Migration. Beginning during the war, African Americans 
primarily from the rural South moved to northern cities in search of industrial jobs 
supporting the war effort. After the war, technological changes within the farming 
industry greatly reduced the need for labor, and as unemployed farm laborers sought new 
employment, the migration trend continued. Prior to the war, Boston’s minority 
population made up only 10% of the city and was primarily middle-class. Afterwards, not 
only was the total percentage of the minority population higher, but the African-
American community had a much larger percentage of low-income households. The 
city’s African-American population rose an astonishing 342% to 104,000 between 1940 
and 1970.4 As many of these migrants were unemployed and low-income former farm 
laborers, many ended up in government-supported housing. 
 At the same time as the minority population of Boston and many other cities was 
rising, the percentage of white households was declining. In Boston, this drop was 
particularly sharp. The percentage of white households dropped 31% between 1940 and 
1970. The city’s surrounding suburbs gained 1 million people during the 1950s alone, 
giving the Greater Boston region one of the lowest ratios of residents in the central city to 
residents in the metropolitan area in the entire United States (.27 for Boston, compared to 
.46 for Philadelphia and .73 for New York City).5 By 1970, Boston’s population was 
                                                
4 Formisano, Boston against Busing, 25. 
 
5 Formisano, Boston against Busing, 12. 
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approximately half a million, but its suburbs contained roughly an additional one and a 
half million, most of whom were residing in overwhelmingly white towns.6  
 Formisano argues that Boston’s particularly sharp urban/suburban divide is a 
function of the city’s geography. For many American cities, the geographic limits cover a 
large percentage of the surrounding area; however, the City of Boston is comprised of 
only 48.3 square miles. By comparison, Baltimore is 80.9 square miles and Philadelphia 
is 134.1 square miles. The reason for the discrepancy is historical; while most cities were 
able to absorb their surrounding suburbs over time, many of Boston’s suburbs were 
politically strong and resisted amalgamation. This has meant that suburbanization has 
been easier in Boston than in other cities as there are more opportunities for households 
to move into suburban towns while still remaining close enough to enjoy the benefits 
(jobs, culture, services, etc.) of proximity to a major metropolitan downtown.  
 At the same time as Boston’s racial makeup was changing, so too were the city’s 
economics. In 1970, Boston had one of the highest costs of living in the US, but with a 
median family income ranking it 24th out of the country’s 30 largest cities.7 This made 
Boston particularly susceptible to the recession and stagflation of that decade. Making 
matters even worse, employers increasingly followed their workers by moving to the 
suburbs; 66,000 jobs were added to the Route 128 Corridor (the area abutting the city’s 
suburban circumferential highway) from 1958 to 1967, while several thousand jobs were 
                                                
6 Formisano, Boston against Busing, 13. 
 
7 Formisano, Boston against Busing, 14-15. 
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lost within the city limits.8 Reflecting the decline of household income, within Boston 
public schools, 76% of students qualified for subsidized or free lunches during the 1972-
1973 school year, and 61% of students came from households at or below the federal 
poverty level in 1976.9  
 These large-scale demographic changes made desegregation in Boston and across 
the country difficult. For example, two new elementary schools that opened in 1971 had 
purposefully been built in racially mixed parts of Dorchester in an active effort to create 
integrated schools; however, between the time the schools were planned and the time that 
they opened, the school’s neighborhoods had become almost completely African 
American, and the effort was for nothing.10 Figure 3 below illustrates exactly how racial 
demographics within Boston’s neighborhoods changed between 1960 and 1970 as many 
mixed neighborhoods became majority minority and the total number of minority 
neighborhoods grew. Comparing Figure 3 to Figure 4, which maps BHA’s public housing 
properties, its easy to see the challenge these changes to the population presented to BHA 
and BPS. As the agencies were attempting to desegregate their tenants and students, the 
neighborhoods around them were becoming increasingly minority majority and 
increasingly segregated.  
 
 
                                                
8 Formisano, Boston against Busing, 12. 
 
9 Formisano, Boston against Busing, 17. 
 
10 Formisano, Boston against Busing, 49. 
 Chapter 4 
Segregation and the Boston Public School System 
 
 
 
 
Desegregation in the city of Boston’s public school system set off a shocking 
wave of protest and violence that tore through the city. To that point in time, Boston had 
enjoyed a reputation as a progressive hot bed: it was home to world famous universities; 
it had been a center for Abolitionism; and it had raised the all African-American 54th 
Regiment during the Civil War. However, the 1974 ruling that held the Boston School 
Committee responsible for maintaining a deliberately segregated school system, and the 
imposed system of forced busing the ruling created, exposed long dormant tensions that 
lay just beneath Boston’s shiny veneer. The city was in a state of chaos as State Troopers 
were called in to protect bused children from rock throwing mobs. The entire episode was 
so divisive that even today, long after the violence has dissipated, the city is still debating 
issues like school assignment policy and dealing with the fallout from this bad piece of its 
history.  
 Nationally, racial segregation within public schools was outlawed by the 1954 
Supreme Court ruling in Brown vs the Board of Education; however, enforcement, 
policies, and programs addressing racial imbalance were slow to come. This was the case 
even as racial attitudes nationwide changed over time, and as the idea of racial integration 
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became more widely embraced.11 One of the main reasons for the slow response was the 
unclear mandate from the Federal Government as to what exactly local governments 
should do to address the Brown ruling. In Boston and many other cities, this lack of 
clarity created a vacuum into which stepped a series of local politicians who were able to 
capitalize on the issue as they rose to power. Particularly in Boston, these politicians were 
able to delay action on desegregation within the school system for years until higher 
governmental powers finally were able to intervene. For Boston, it was the state court 
that ultimately stepped in by mandating the forced busing program.   
 Formisano points to a number of questions regarding desegregation that still 
lingered after the Brown ruling.12 Chief among them was the question of whether  
schools were required to achieve a racially balanced student body or were they required 
only to provide equal access? Clouding the issue further, although the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act required that color blindness be incorporated in policies for schools receiving federal 
money, actively tracking racial data became the main tool for tracking the pace of 
integration. In the state of Massachusetts, the Racial Imbalance Act of 1965 explicitly 
required all public schools in the commonwealth to track and report on the racial makeup 
of their student body.  
 In Boston, the unclear mandate from the Federal Government combined with 
political leaders who were actively opposed to integration to create an environment of 
                                                
11 Lawrence Bobo, Howard Schuman, and Charlotte Steeh, “Changing Racial Attitudes toward 
Residential Integration,” in Housing Desegregation and Federal Policy, ed. John M. Goering (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press,1986). 
 
12 Formisano, Boston against Busing, 19. 
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political inertia. Leaders actively looking for solutions debated options such as a 
restructuring of the school committee, an expansion of the city-wide transfer program, 
and an expansion of the METCO program (by which students were bussed outside of 
Boston to suburban schools).13 Meanwhile, leaders actively opposed to desegregation 
were left to strengthen their coalition. Ultimately, this inertia resulted in the court system 
forcing a program onto the school system that neither side supported or had any hand in 
formulating.   
                                                
13 Formisano, Boston against Busing, 72. 
 
 Chapter 5 
Segregation in Public and Private Housing 
 
 
 
 
 By the time the Boston Housing Authority began its desegregation efforts in the 
1970s, the city of Boston, as well as the entire United States, had faced a long-term 
entrenchment of racial segregation in the housing market. This occurred not only in 
public housing, but in the general residential market as well. In many instances, 
segregation was explicitly the letter of the law. In others, government policies had 
unexpected consequences that either caused or perpetuated segregation. This has made 
desegregation a difficult task in the United States because, even though (similarly to 
school desegregation) public opinion has grown to embrace housing desegregation, the 
long-term patterns already in place have made results hard to achieve.  
 Before the Civil Rights Era, racial segregation in the general housing market was 
common. Many landlords and home sellers attached racially restrictive housing 
covenants to their properties to exclude minority residents. Similarly, redlining, a practice 
by which lenders would literally draw a red line to indicate where they would not make 
home loans to minority households, was common. These and similar practices were 
accepted as the norm and entirely legal in many places. Even within the federal 
government, many housing programs were explicitly segregationist. The early 
underwriting manual used by the Federal Housing Administration covering home loans 
required that housing be built to be racially homogenous, a practice that more or less 
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required racially restrictive housing covenants and redlining.14 The FHA also followed 
lending policies that made receiving home loans tougher for African-American 
households than their white counterparts. This in turn helped to spur the migration of 
white households to the suburbs discussed above, and all but ensured that minority 
households could not follow.15 
 Within public housing specifically, racial segregation has a long and difficult 
history. For the most part, segregation within public housing has reflected the segregation 
of society at large,16 but with the addition of some of its own unique problems. Early in 
the federal public housing program, developments built to accommodate industrial 
workers during WWII were explicitly segregated.17 Site selection for public housing 
construction has been particularly problematic as the decentralization of responsibility for 
selecting sites to local authorities has driven housing developments overwhelmingly 
towards politically weak minority neighborhoods as local politicians from politically 
stronger white neighborhoods have blocked construction rather than face backlash from 
their constituents.18 The city of Chicago went so far as to formalize this process by giving 
                                                
14 Arnold Hirsch, “Choosing Segregation: Federal Housing Policy between Shelley and Brown,” 
in From Tenements to the Taylor Homes, ed. John F. Bauman, Roger Biles, and Kristin M. Szylvian 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 208-209. 
 
15 Hirsch, “Choosing Segregation,” 209. 
 
16 R. Allen Hayes, The Federal Government and Urban Housing: Ideology and Change in Public 
Policy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995) 132. 
 
17 Kristin M. Szylvian, “The Federal Housing Program During World War II,” in From Tenements 
to the Taylor Homes, ed. John F. Bauman, Roger Biles, and Kristin M. Szylvian (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 129. 
 
18 Hayes, The Federal Government and Urban Housing, 92. 
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City Councilors de facto veto power over public housing construction within their wards. 
This practice resulted in almost all public housing units within the city being constructed 
in minority neighborhoods.19  
 The legal and programmatic framework creating housing segregation began to 
change during the Civil Rights Era as public opinion came to embrace the concept of 
desegregation20 and political leaders responded accordingly. Democratic leaders during 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations increasing saw urban Africa Americans as an 
important part of a winning electoral coalition, and in response, moved to embrace the 
issues raised during the Civil Rights Era, housing segregation among them.21 Hayes 
identifies a number of early legislation and rule changes as important: first, a relaxing of 
mortgage underwriting criteria by the FHA in an effort to provide more home loans to 
residents in inner city neighborhoods (a change later codified in the Housing Act of 
1968); and second, the expansion of the government-backed mortgage insurance program 
to cover rental housing via legislation in 1961 (expanded again in 1968).22 In 1964, Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act banned segregation in all federally assisted housing. In 1966, 
the city of Chicago lost a suit over the site selection policy discussed above. Similarly, 
the cities of Lackawanna, Pennsylvania and Black Jack, Missouri were also both 
successfully sued for excluding public housing from middle class white neighborhoods. 
                                                
19 Frederick A. Lazin, “Federal Low-Income Housing Assistance Programs and Racial 
Segregation: Leased Public Housing,” Public Policy 24 Summer 1976, 337-60. 
 
20 Bobo, Schuman, and Steeh, “Changing Racial Attitudes Toward Residential Integration.” 
 
21 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: Functions of Public Welfare 
(New York City: Pantheon Books, 1971).  
 
22 Hayes, The Federal Government and Urban Housing. 
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In 1968, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act. In Shannon vs. HUD, the court directed 
the Office of Housing and Urban Development to take the racial and economic 
composition of neighborhoods into account when making site selections for public 
housing, and to not worsen existing racial and economic segregation. Responding to these 
cases and other similar pressure, in 1971, President Nixon ordered HUD to actively 
promote equal housing opportunity.23 
 Even with legal protection and growing acceptance however, actual enforcement 
of fair housing was slow to evolve over time. The FHA especially was slow to respond. 
Racially restrictive housing covenants had been outlawed in 1948 via the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Shelley vs. Kramer, but enforcement of the ruling was almost non-
existent within the FHA as officials at the time claimed the ruling did not apply to them.24 
After the Brown ruling in 1954, a prominent FHA official was fired for merely raising the 
idea that the Brown ruling’s invalidation of “separate but equal” might apply to public 
housing. 25 Even after the agency was directed to end its segregationist policies, the FHA 
still conducted business with home builders who explicitly would not rent or sell to 
minorities.26 Outside of the FHA, enforcement was equally difficult. In 1962, President 
Kennedy signed an executive order mandating the prevention of segregation in federally 
subsidized housing; however, the order was written to only cover new construction, and 
                                                
23 Hayes, The Federal Government and Urban Housing, 132. 
 
24 Hirsch, “Choosing Segregation,” 207-214. 
 
25 Hirsch, “Choosing Segregation,” 220. 
 
26 Gail Radford, “The Federal Government and Housing During the Great Depression,” in From 
Tenements to the Taylor Homes, ed. John F. Bauman, Roger Biles, and Kristin M. Szylvian (University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 115. 
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compliance was found by HUD to be erratic.27 The Civil Rights Act of 1968 had codified 
non-discrimination in housing, but it too proved an ineffective enforcement tool.28 After 
Kennedy and Johnson, the Nixon and Ford administrations were reluctant to bring cases 
to the courts under the 1968 Act, and enforcement only became nominally stronger under 
President Carter.29 It was not until 1974 that the Housing Act of that year finally gave the 
federal government an effective enforcement tool by tying fair housing compliance to the 
disbursement of Community Development Block Grant funds (described in more detail 
below). 
 In addition to the problems discussed above, the public housing program has had 
a particularly tough time dealing with segregation due to the fact that many of its 
seemingly race-neutral rules and policies have had unexpected consequences either 
leading to or furthering racial segregation.30 Even as the legal and programmatic 
framework that explicitly created segregated housing has eroded, public housing 
segregation has continued in part because these issues are harder to identify and correct. 
In particular, the federal legislation that created most public housing in the United States 
was tied to slum clearance in the Housing Act of 1949. The combination happened for 
two reasons. The first was that politicians, looking for expediency, could tie two 
seemingly great ideas together; horrible slums could be torn down and new public 
                                                
27 Roger Biles, “Public Housing and the Postwar Urban Renaissance, 1949-1973,” in From 
Tenements to the Taylor Homes, ed. John F. Bauman, Roger Biles, and Kristin M. Szylvian (University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 151. 
 
28 Hayes, The Federal Government and Urban Housing, 261.  
 
29 Charles M. Lamb, “Fair Housing Implementation from Nixon to Reagan.” Robert A LaFollette 
Institute of Public Affairs, Working Paper Number 11. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1992. 
 
30 Hirsch, “Choosing Segregation,” 206-226. 
  18 
housing developments could be built in their place. The second was that including slum 
clearance broadened the coalition of supporters for housing legislation to include 
business groups, big city mayors, bankers, and builders looking to revive struggling 
downtowns.31 What politicians did not account for, however, was that politically weak 
minority neighborhoods would fall victim to clearance more often than their white 
counterparts. Furthermore, the 1949 Act’s mandate that housing developments maintain 
existing neighborhood racial make-up led formerly mixed but majority minority (and 
mixed but majority low income) neighborhoods to become extreme concentrations of 
poor minorities. Even though, like most explicitly segregationist law, that provision too 
was eventually abandoned, a self-sustaining pattern had been created.  
 The public’s changing opinion of racial segregation presents another issue for 
desegregation. As mentioned above, between the 1950s and 1980s, the general concept of 
racial integration was embraced by an increasingly large percentage of the population.32 
The issue remained, however, that the general public’s acceptance of any given 
desegregation plan was generally found to be low. Within public housing projects 
specifically, white respondents on average were more likely to accept minority residents 
moving to their development than they were to accept being moved to a development that 
was majority minority. Furthermore, white households were more willing to accept 
voluntary programs over enforced programs. Researchers also found that views on the 
                                                
 
31 Biles, “Public Housing and the Postwar Urban Renaissance,” 144. 
  
32 Bobo, Schuman, and Steeh, “Changing Racial Attitudes Toward Residential Integration,” 152-
170. 
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subject were complex and went beyond simple support or non-support for desegregation. 
Simply put, although Americans had come to support housing desegregation, the way 
they wanted to accomplish it was still up for debate. 
For desegregation in Boston, these national sentiments ran up against a city with 
many unique issues. With regards to the school system, Boston’s particular desegregation 
tension often fell along racial lines; however, race was not the only or even largest cause 
of the city’s problems, and it was likely the additional factors unique to Boston that made 
the city’s school desegregation more volatile than school desegregation in other cities.33 
To a large extent, Boston’s tension surrounding desegregation mirrored the tension 
around the country during the 1970s centered on white working-class backlash against 
the Civil Rights Movement, the New Deal, and the Democratic Party, and the public’s 
growing embrace of emerging Republican conservative ideology.34 Boston’s tension 
added a dangerous mix of ethnicity, religion, class, and a sense of “turf” on top. In 
particular, the city had a long and troublesome history of the political process being 
dominated by a patronage-based system, with select insider groups (first the old Yankee 
families, and later the Irish) benefiting at the expense of others (first the Irish and later 
African Americans and other minority groups). Exacerbating issues, patronage had led 
Bostonians to feel that political problems were not solved through the legal system or via 
agency programs and policies, but by organization, argument, and coalition building. As 
                                                
33 Formisano, Boston against Busing, 222-239. 
 
34 For an in-depth discussion, see the following; Jefferson Cowie. Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the 
Last Days of the Working Class. New York City: the New Press, 2010; and Bruce J. Schulman, The 
Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 
2002. 
  
  20 
an example, many of the strongest anti-busing neighborhoods in Boston during the 1970s 
had just gone through battles with the City, State, and Federal Government over urban 
renewal. The fight over slum clearance, highway construction, and public housing 
construction had strengthened Bostonian’s sense of turf, and enforced in their minds the 
idea that turf needed protection.  
 
 
 Chapter 6 
The General State of the Federal Public Housing Program and the Boston Housing 
Authority prior to and throughout the 1970s 
 
 
At the start of the 1970s, the Boston Housing Authority was one of the largest 
housing authorities in the United States and one of the largest government agencies in the 
City of Boston. The 1970 annual report published by the BHA lists approximately 98,000 
people living in assisted housing. That number represents about 10% of the total 
population of the city at the time.  
As to whether or not racial tension existed in Boston’s public housing prior to 
desegregation, reports are varied. In 1962, the Boston Globe interviewed tenants at 
Columbia Point in the Dorchester neighborhood and received mixed answers.35 One 
interviewee described tensions between African American and white tenants, as well as 
tensions between the primarily middle-class African Americans native to Boston and the 
lower income African Americans who had recently arrived from the South. Another 
tenant contended that relations were generally good, and still another pointed to tenant 
clubs at Columbia Point as, “the best integrated I’ve ever seen.” The Globe article also 
describes efforts by tenants to close a nearby garbage dump as “a study in interracial 
harmony.” The paper elaborates,  
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When it was necessary for the mothers to attend a hearing at the State house on 
the closing of the dumps, Negro mothers babysat with white children and white 
mothers reciprocated. 
 
 During that period, of the 1504 households at Columbia Point, 209 (14%) were African 
American, approximately the same percentage as BHA’s properties as a whole.36  
Leading up to desegregation, a number of changes outside of the hands of BHA 
and its tenants had a major impact on the quality of life within BHA properties. The first 
was a change in the way the Federal Government viewed and administered the public 
housing program. The second was a major decline in the amount of funding public 
housing agencies received, both via the Federal Government and their own rent 
collection. The third was the changing demographics of the city discussed above resulting 
in an influx of low-income African-American households into BHA properties. These 
factors combined in a way that left BHA’s properties in dire straights by the time the 
agency was attempting to desegregate.  
 
 
Policy Changes within the Federal Government 
 
The Federal Government’s policy changes revolved around two principles: first, 
that public housing programs should focus their scarce resources on provide housing of 
last resort; and second, that tenants’ right to privacy had not been given enough weight in 
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policy decisions. As well intentioned as these policies were, in practice, the way they 
were implemented resulted in multiple unforeseen negative outcomes.  
As originally envisioned in the Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949, the public 
housing program provided housing assistance either to households experiencing 
temporary economic trouble due to the Depression or to households of industrial workers 
moving to areas experiencing housing shortages due to mobilization for WWII .37 
Housing built by the Public Works Administration during the Depression accepted any 
household regardless of income.38 Federally subsidized housing was also used to serve 
the huge number of veterans returning from WWII as they swelled populations and 
created housing shortages across the country, and public housing served the same role 
again during and after the Korean Conflict.39 In those early days, BHA followed strict 
screening procedures for accepting tenants, and BHA property managers were 
empowered to mediate conflicts between residents and evict problem households.40 
Nationally, some housing authorities even went so far as to enforce policies on pets, 
visitors, the amount and arrangement of furniture in a unit, and the color paint tenants 
could use.41 Although these policies were often draconian, combined with the lack of 
income means testing, the result at the time was a tenant population comprised of 
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households with a range of income levels who adhered to a strict level of maintenance of 
their units. 
Over time, the focus of the federal government’s housing program began to 
change with regards to the population to be served. For the most part, these changes 
reflect the differing attitudes of conservatives and liberals within the United States as to 
the appropriate role that the government should take in the housing market.42 Liberals 
have generally believed that the government should take an active role in producing 
housing to alleviate slums and housing shortages, and that this housing should be open to 
all income levels. The housing built during the Depression and WWII are examples of 
programs designed along these lines. Conservatives have generally been wary of 
government involvement, and they have been fearful that government-provided housing 
might create inappropriate competition with private business. Overtime, this political 
push and pull refocused housing programs to focus only on providing housing of last 
resort to households with the lowest levels of income who would otherwise be homeless. 
Regardless of which view point is correct, the change in focus by the Federal 
Government (and the Office of Housing and Urban Development by extension) had a 
number of consequences that negatively impacted BHA and other housing agencies. 
Across the country, new program guidelines were introduced, screening criteria was 
loosened,43 and property managers lost their eviction powers.44 To HUD, if public 
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housing should only provide a resource for people with nowhere else to go, then 
screening and eviction would only result in those people becoming homeless.  Perhaps 
ironically in retrospect, HUD’s directives were embraced by BHA and its tenants at the 
time as the agency had increasingly receiving push back from tenants and tenants’ rights 
groups concerning the draconian screening, housekeeping checks, and other oversight not 
required in the private housing market that were seen as an invasion of privacy unfairly 
forced on public housing tenants.45 Although these ideas may have been entirely correct 
in theory, the problem was that once screening, eviction, and mediation were abandoned, 
it became impossible for property managers and housing authorities to deal with problem 
households. As one resident at Columbia Point put it,  
 
Somewhere along the way, someone from downtown said to the manager at 
Columbia Point, “You no longer can go in and review a person’s housekeeping, 
tell a person that they can be evicted, demand that they clean the hallways” – all 
of these rights were taken away from management, and when that happened, you 
started to see trash in the halls and the busted windows and the door hanging off 
the hinges.46  
 
The ultimate result of these changes was BHA and other housing authorities being asked 
to serve more households with an increasing number of social problems, while at the 
same time being given fewer programmatic tools to do so. 
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Declining Operating Budgets 
 
Making matters worse during the 1960s, the entire federal housing program was 
facing severe financial trouble.47 During the 1950s and early 1960s, the Federal 
Government had paid the cost of construction for public housing development, but 
individual housing agencies were responsible for operating costs that covered things like 
cleaning, repairs, and modernization.48 For housing authorities, the main source of 
funding for operating costs was rent collected from their tenants. This arrangement was 
not a major issue for housing authorities early on, because the public housing program 
included a sizable population of middle-class tenants who could be charged high enough 
rents to cover the needs of the operating budget; however, the situation changed during 
the 1960s when the amount of rent the BHA and other authorities could take in dropped 
precipitously.49 The first issue was that the focus on housing of last resort meant a higher 
percentage of tenants were low and extremely low income (median income of public 
housing households dropped 47.1% to 36.9% as a percentage of US median family 
income between 1961 and 1970,50 and the percentage of public housing households 
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receiving additional public assistance grew51). The second was that inflation during the 
1960s and into the 1970s reduced the buying power of the rent money authorities 
collected.52 The third issue was that a federal amendment that was passed in 1969 
lowered the rent cap housing authorities could charge to 25% of a tenant’s income.53 
Fourth and finally, in 1973, President Nixon declared a moratorium on all federal funding 
for public housing. Although the moratorium was ultimately lifted, the period of zero 
funding left already cash-strapped agencies reeling. As they did nationwide, these factors 
combined to decimate the operating budget of the BHA, and in turn, decimate the 
agency’s ability to keep up with cleaning, repair, and modernization of its properties. 
For BHA and other housing agencies, these funding issues could not have come at 
a worse time. It was during this period that many of the original properties constructed 
under the federal public housing program were reaching the end of the 20-year life cycle 
that they had been designed for. Many needed repair, maintenance, or upgrading that the 
BHA had no funding to address. The quality of life within many BHA properties during 
the late 1960s and early 1970s was dropping at an alarming rate. 
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Increasing Low-Income Population 
 
Another major factor impacting Boston and the BHA leading up to desegregation 
was the demographic shift within the city discussed above. Within a few years, many 
BHA properties that had formerly been majority white or mixed race became majority 
minority due to the population influx of low-income African-American households and 
the population loss of white households. Additionally, households of all backgrounds 
who could afford to move out did so, and increasingly, any incoming white household 
was assigned by BHA to segregated buildings. 
Leading up to BHA’s desegregation efforts in the 1970s, all of these factors had 
resulted in not just the BHA, but also the entire federal public housing program, 
struggling. Housing agencies were tasked with serving an increasing number of 
households, an increasing percentage of whom faced severe social problems, while at the 
same time contending with plummeting federal support and funding from rent collection 
to address issues with properties requiring a huge amount of maintenance work.  
 
 
Declining Quality of Life and the Perez Case 
 
By the start of the 1970s, BHA properties were in a state of major disrepair, with 
some being so bad that they were almost abandoned completely (30% of all BHA units 
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were vacant, with 80% of units at Columbia Point vacant54). Many of the middle-class 
households who had moved into public housing during the housing shortage of the 1950s 
had moved out, and increasingly, any low-income households who could afford to leave 
did so as well. Ironically, just as the major influx of new residents arrived in Boston, the 
BHA was forced to leave units vacant because it could not afford to rehabilitate them. 
Over time, the state of disrepair, nearly deserted corridors, and inability of management 
to deal with problem households resulted in increasingly poor living conditions, and this 
in turn led to an increasingly violent environment. In 1979, the Boston Phoenix 
newspaper summed up the condition within BHA’s properties at the time by offering this 
description of Columbia Point: 
 
In the early 1970s, the Boston Housing Authority stopped providing services to 
Columbia Point. Garbage was not picked up, windows were not repaired, toilets 
leaked for three months before they were fixed. Tenants nearly froze in the 
winter; pipes burst and apartments flooded. People began to leave. Squatters 
moved into some vacated units, prostitutes into others, and addicts and pushers 
turned still other apartments into shooting galleries. 
 
Today, Columbia Point is something like a ghost town. Despite a severe housing 
shortage and a long waiting list for public housing, the BHA has been using its 
rehabilitation money to board up most of the 1504 units. Only about 350 families 
and 75 elderly remain where more than 5,000 people once lived.55 
 
In a strange parallel to the city’s school desegregation, a judge’s ruling provided 
the impetus for change at BHA (even stranger, both judges were named Garrity, although 
they were not related). In February of 1975, a group of BHA tenants led by Armando 
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Perez of the Mission Hill development filed a class action lawsuit against the BHA on 
behalf of its tenants. Although the suit was not directly related to desegregation, it 
provided the final push for BHA to begin addressing the problem, and created the 
framework under which it would occur. Within a month of the suit’s filing, judge Paul 
Garrity ruled that BHA’s properties were “not decent, nor are they safe, nor are they in 
compliance with the provisions of the state sanitary code.”56 The response from BHA 
openly and bluntly acknowledged that Judge Garrity was correct, with the BHA’s chief of 
Planning and Modernization replying,  
 
The needs we have in those developments, by HUD’s own standards, are 
enormous. It would cost $150 million to put those projects in shape, and I’m 
getting $3.5 million a year to deal with that. The way we are trying to handle the 
older public housing is obsolete. And on top of that, the national commitment to 
public housing stinks.57  
 
Initially, Judge Garrity placed a court-appointed master in charge of ensuring the BHA 
complied with the court’s ruling to implement improvement plans. Finally, in July of 
1979, after four more years of litigation and BHA’s failure to make sizable improvements 
to living conditions, Judge Garrity put the BHA into court receivership. This took the 
BHA out of the City of Boston’s control, giving it to the court and their appointed 
administrator.  
                                                
 
56 Roessner, A Decent Place to Live, 178. 
 
57 Roessner, A Decent Place to Live, 180. 
 
  31 
The Perez ruling was the final push for the BHA to address the racial segregation 
of its tenants. Like many agencies, the BHA had taken little action while the legal 
framework for desegregation had been slowly building during the Civil Rights Era. 
Although it had begun to contemplate action after the Housing Act of 1974 finally 
provided an effective enforcement mechanism, it was the Perez case that finally pushed 
the BHA out of its bureaucratic morass on the issue of segregation and forced the agency 
to make major changes.  
 
 
 Chapter 7 
Design and Implementation of BHA Desegregation 
 
 
 
 
Internal BHA memos illustrate that the agency was beginning to take the issue of 
segregation seriously after the Housing Act of 1974. HUD had given housing agencies a 
strict directive to comply with the Fair Housing component of the Act. One BHA memo 
vividly laid out the federal stance, stating: 
 
HUD is aggressively pursuing its command to enforce affirmative action 
requirements. They require initiative, not just reaction. They require programs, 
not just plans. They require performance, not just promise. Applicants for Federal 
dollars must demonstrate initiative, programs, and performance to expand 
opportunities, services, and facilities for minorities, female-headed families, and 
other segments of the low-income population if they hope to receive funding.58  
 
At risk for BHA and other housing authorities were Community Development Block 
Grants (large chunks of unrestricted money agencies could spend on any of their 
initiatives) that made up a significant portion of BHA’s budget. As the memo outlines, 
HUD required initiative, programs, and demonstrable performance in enforcing 
affirmative action from any agency hoping to hold on to its CDBG funding. Without the 
ability to do so, and without HUD’s CDBGs, operating the BHA would be even more 
impossible than it already was.  
The 1974 Housing Act’s connection of desegregation programs to CDBG funds 
gave HUD a strong tool for enforcing fair housing, and in doing so, provided many 
                                                
58 Affirmative Action Requirements for Fair Housing. Fair Housing Taskforce Subject File. 
Boston Housing Authority Archives, Boston City Archives, Boston, MA. 
 
  33 
housing authorities with the largest reason to aggressively pursue desegregation 
programs.  However, similarly to questions that still surrounded public schools after the 
Brown case, what any individual agency’s program looked like was left almost 
completely up in the air. Even exactly what the mandate from HUD encompassed could 
be problematic to interpret.59 Desegregation was clear, but should local agencies actively 
enforce integration or just provide equal opportunity? What should an agency do if it 
provided equal opportunity but minority families did not take advantage of it? As it was, 
agencies were required to avoid any program that would create an undue concentration of 
low-income persons, but what constitutes an undue concentration?  
 Facing funding cuts if they did not comply with a policy that contained no 
specific programs attached, it almost seems fortuitous that BHA lost the Perez case and 
fell under court order to rehabilitate the agency’s properties. Rehabilitation would require 
moving tenants into new apartments while maintenance work was performed on older 
units. Until that time, households applying to BHA would select three developments into 
which they would like to move.60 BHA would then place applicants onto waiting lists for 
each of the selected developments, and as units became available, select households 
starting with those who had applied first. The change BHA made after Perez was to give 
priority waiting list placements to white households agreeing to move into majority 
minority developments and minority households agreeing to move into majority white 
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developments. This way, rehabilitation moves could be tied to achieving some sort of 
racial balance. Almost immediately after the ruling, BHA began sending letters to tenant 
organizations for comment, and in 1977, began the program that the agency labeled 
“modernization.”  
Two differences between Boston school and public housing desegregations efforts 
that stand out are the leadership from BHA officials (under the court appointed master, 
and later, the receiver), and participation from BHA tenants. Both engaged throughout 
the 1970s in desegregation issues, and both were also directly engaged with each other. 
Whether or not those engagements always resulted in positive outcomes is debatable, but 
the interaction between the agency and the people it served clearly happened in a way 
that was starkly different from the schools. 
Like BHA, the Boston School Committee was well aware of their segregation 
issue in the early 1970s. However, unlike the housing agency, the school committee did 
nothing of note to address the problem. Formisano argues that school committee inaction 
was a direct result of patronage politics.61 Under the patronage system, lobbying becomes 
increasingly important as interest groups are pitted against each other to divide scarce 
resources. The end result is a political culture where participants feel there’s no problem 
that cannot be argued out of. Thus, although Boston school committee members knew 
they had a problem, they never felt that the Federal Government, the judiciary, or anyone 
else would force them to do anything that the school committee did not want to do. The 
end result was a program that was  forced on them that they had no input in creating. 
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The contrast between BHA and the Boston School Committee is puzzling. Why 
did one group of leaders in the schools avoid the issue and the other in the housing 
authority actively address it? The casual observer would probably assume that the two 
groups might fall into the same trap. Both were part of the City of Boston government, 
and both were comprised primarily of Bostonians all likely possessing the same social 
norms of the time. It is likely that the key difference between BHA and the school 
committee was their differing relationships with the Federal Government. BHA was 
heavily reliant on HUD for funding, had an open channel of communication with them, 
and had to be responsive to their affirmative action requirements. The school committee 
had none of those things or experienced them at a negligible level. Furthermore, with the 
appointment of the court master, leadership of the BHA was completely removed from 
the City of Boston government.   
In addition to official BHA leadership, public housing desegregation efforts also 
benefited from leadership within the projects themselves. Together with residents, BHA 
formed the Tenants Policy Council in 1968.62 Tenants won seats on the BHA board in 
1970, and crucially, the 1974 Housing Act had called for the creation of tenant 
organizations to provide input in project management. Tenants formed voluntary resident 
patrols at a number of properties in 1974.63 Perhaps most strikingly, under an 
experimental program, the tenant organization at Bromley-Heath in Jamaica Plain was 
itself put in charge of managing the property. This program was generally seen as 
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successful by the BHA, with the head of the agency Samuel Thompson writing in the 
1973-1974 Annual Report: 
 
During the past year, the Bromley-Heath Tenant Management Corporation 
continued to fulfill the expectations of the BHA and other agencies that a 
community-based tenant organization can perform the management functions of 
public housing, in some situations more adequately than by use of conventional 
management models and techniques as was the case when the Development was 
under the management of the BHA. Confirmation of this judgment is supported 
by visual examination of the premises, tenant-voiced comparisons of a before-
and-after nature, critical cost-benefit analyses of the fiscal and productivity 
records, and the demonstrated capacity of the community to react constructively 
and affirmatively to the increasing problems of urban life.64 
 
Thus, when BHA was devising desegregation programs, project residents had a pre-
existing forum for involvement.  
This relationship played out during desegregation implementation. In 1975 when 
the BHA was determining how to spend its modernization funds at Columbia Point, it 
wrote directly to the Columbia Point Task Force and Tenants Action Group,65 and the 
BHA wrote directly back to them when the modernization plan was finally in place in 
1977.66 In fact, Columbia Point Tenants often communicated with BHA officials about 
their concerns: residents wrote asking for space to open a Puerto Rican Community 
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Center67; they wrote asking BHA to hire more Spanish-speaking maintenance staff68; and 
when Mayor White froze them out of discussions over a 1979 redevelopment plan, they 
wrote to complain about the lack of involvement.69 It is perhaps related then that, in 
response to increased drug dealing around the project in 1977, rather than do nothing, the 
Columbia Point tenants organized into a public watch that they called, “The People’s 
Militia.”70  
 East Boston’s Maverick development had similar community involvement. 
Tenants were in communication with the BHA about increased violence due to 
desegregation and the need for increased communication between tenants and the agency 
as early as 1975. In August 1976, tenants and the BHA were communicating about a 
diversionary youth jobs program. Responding to the Maverick tenants, the program was 
set up and a fulltime director position was established in June of 1978.71 The tenants had 
an open line of communication with the BHA, and the BHA had an open line of 
communication back to Maverick, and perhaps most importantly, the BHA instituted a 
program at Maverick based on Maverick tenants’ input.  
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 Similar discussions between tenants and the BHA occurred at the Faneuil 
development in Boston’s Brighton neighborhood. At Faneuil, tenants, the BHA, and a 
private business came together to create a summer recreational services program for 12-
18 year olds.72 In approving the program, the BHA noted the volatile situation at Faneuil, 
but lauded everyone involved for working together to create a potential solution. A 
similar example of collaborative problem solving at Faneuil was the development of a 
Boy Scout and Explorers troop.73 In addition to year-round diversionary activities, 15 
Scouts from Faneuil were able to participate in summer camp, and an additional 30 to 40 
slots were provided for day camps. Not only does the creation of these programs illustrate 
the level of communication between BHA and its tenants, but more importantly, that 
BHA leaders were supportive of the dialogue.  
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 Chapter 8 
Violence 
 
 
Making an argument that public housing desegregation differed from public 
school desegregation with regards to resulting violence or lack there of is difficult 
because both identifying violence surrounding BHA desegregation, and then comparing it 
to violence surrounding busing, are difficult tasks. Violence over forced busing is easy to 
see; it resulted in mass protests and widespread disruption that impacted the vast majority 
of Boston residents in negative ways. It was famously captured in The Soiling of Old 
Glory, the iconic photo of white protestors assaulting a black man with an American flag 
on City Hall Plaza. By comparison, housing desegregation does not have an iconic photo 
and did not have the comparable widespread, long-term, and intense protests centered on 
it. That is not to say desegregation at BHA was non-violent. In fact, Boston’s public 
housing projects were the scene of incredible violence throughout the 1970s. Identifying 
violence at BHA properties during desegregation efforts is not the main problem 
however; the problem is separating busing specific violence, desegregation specific 
violence, and the general sense of lawlessness that permeated BHA properties as they fell 
into disrepair.  
A letter to the BHA from a group of senior citizens at the Franklin Field 
development in Roxbury exemplifies the general state of life within the city’s public 
housing at the time (unfortunately, although the letter is contained with other materials 
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from the 1970s, it is not dated).  In their letter, the tenants ask BHA to provide them with 
a 24-hour armed guard.74 They reported numerous incidents: break-ins were occurring 
after hours; five televisions, one air conditioner, and 6 cars had been stolen; attempted 
burglaries had occurred at six additional units; and four people had been recently stabbed, 
with others reportedly mugged or beaten. None of these incidents are specifically related 
to desegregation, but like the problems outlined previously at Columbia Point, illustrate 
what life was like within BHA properties regardless of any additional problems caused 
by desegregation.  
Maverick is a good example of a development with easy-to-identify racial 
violence centered specifically on the desegregation effort. An internal BHA memo from 
June 1975 reported on a meeting with BHA officials where residents called for increased 
agency-tenant communication to tackle rising racial tensions in the project.75 Taking a 
survey of Maverick’s African-American tenants, the BHA found one family was planning 
to move and all others were seriously considering it as well.76 Tenants met again with 
BHA officials in August 1976 to call for a diversionary program for kids causing trouble 
around Maverick. 77 To address the problem, a jobs program was put into place that was 
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successful by most accounts; however, despite that effort, Maverick experienced its most 
violent incident of the desegregation era when the apartment of an African-American 
family, the Porters, burned down in December of 1978. The family had previously 
reported to BHA an earlier fire-bombing attempt and that they had faced repeated racial 
harassment.78 The Porters sued the BHA claiming the agency had knowingly put them in 
a dangerous situation by locating them at the contentious Maverick project.79 
South Boston’s Mary Ellen McCormack had similar issues and, like Maverick, 
tenants were in communication with the BHA over solutions.80 The McCormack tenants’ 
solution in the spring of 1975 was a youth center. It seemed like a good idea for a 
development with 707 children under 21, but if the center was ever successful at 
stemming any actual violence is unclear. A BHA agent’s memo requesting an emergency 
move out of McCormack for an African-American household noted that many others 
were already moving out, and that those who remained were being targeted for 
harassment and attacks even if they had had never had a problem previously.81 When the 
preferential placement plan went into effect, only one African American, Faith Evans, 
moved into McCormack. Her stay lasted less than a year, with reports that a friend’s car 
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had been burned, her own car had “Niggers Suck” scratched into the paint, residents had 
yelled “I hate niggers” at her, and one apartment had posted a sign on its door reading, 
“Security Guard – please keep Faith Evans far away from apt 431.”82 As outlined in an 
October 1979 letter to the housing manager, housing and school desegregation were 
raising tension, and children in the development were beginning to feel that violence was 
being condoned.83 The letter closed by reporting that one young McCormack resident had 
gone so far as to say of the violence against African-American tenants, “we’re just 
practicing on you until the Niggers come,” a reference to the wide-spread belief among 
tenants that move-in preference and forced busing were about to give way to forced 
relocation.  
The impact busing had on worsening racial tensions within BHA properties was 
similarly echoed within the Charlestown development. Writing in 1982, a senior BHA 
staffer outlined the grim situation, 
 
At one time, there were nine black families living at Charlestown. Since that 
time, eight have relocated. Presently, there are eleven minority families living 
there; only one of which is black. Discussions with the manager of the 
development… appear to indicate that the community’s reputation for racial 
hostility is not unfounded. While there is evidence that minorities have 
historically been victimized in Charlestown, many tenants and community 
residents point to busing as the lowering of the floodgate of racial animosity and, 
ultimately, violence. There is little doubt, however, that busing did exacerbate the 
overall problem. Most of the blacks living at the Charlestown development began 
to vacate in October 1973, with the last family leaving in February 1976. It was 
mentioned quite frequently that Daryl Williams was a former resident there. 
                                                
82 Mary Thompson. Letter to Mary Kelly. Jan. 5, 1979. Mary Ellen McCormack Project File. Box 
Mass 2-23. Boston Housing Authority Archives, Boston City Archives, Boston, MA. 
 
83 Rosemary Jones. Letter to Mary Ellen McCormack Housing Manager. Oct. 10, 1979. Mary 
Ellen McCormack Project File. Box Mass 2-23. Boston Housing Authority Archives, Boston City 
Archives, Boston, MA. 
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Daryl is a young black Charlestown High ex-football player who was shot by 
persons firing from the roof of a building in the development. At age 18, Daryl is 
now a quadriplegic.84 
 
Across town in Boston’s Brighton neighborhood, the majority white Faneuil 
development experienced a number of ups and downs during desegregation. Initially, 
Faneuil was considered by BHA as one of the more stable developments within the city; 
however, that changed during desegregation. An internal BHA memo (not dated) outlines 
exactly how bad the situation became at Faneuil, 
 
[W]e have experienced a disheartening increase in the vacancy rate recently as a 
direct consequence of episodes of racial violence. We can only look upon this 
occurrence as a serious setback at the development previously regarded as one of 
the more stable in the system.85 
 
Illustrative of the types of violence occurring at Faneuil, in 1979, an African-American 
Faneuil mother notified BHA that a group of white 16 year olds had been harassing her 
family: they had beaten her 9 year old son while he walked to the store; they broke her 
car windows; they broke her apartment windows; and when BHA attempted to solve the 
problem by moving her to a new apartment, they came into the new apartment and broke 
her furniture.86 Whether or not Faneuil ever returned to normal during desegregation 
efforts is unclear, but it is perhaps heartening that a BHA interoffice memo in 1981 
                                                
84 Joseph E. Washington. The Charlestown Open Housing Sub-Plan: A Proposal. June 23, 1982. 
Charlestown Project File. Box Mass. 2-1. Boston Housing Authority Archives, Boston City Archives, 
Boston, MA. 
 
85 Operations Introduction. Court Reports Subject File Box. Boston Housing Authority Archives, 
Boston City Archives, Boston, MA. 
 
86 Unknown. Handwritten Note: March 28, 1979. Faneuil Project Files. Boston Housing Authority 
Archives, Boston City Archives, Boston, MA. 
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reporting on minority households moving into the Faneuil and Fairmount developments 
that September stated, “all of the move-ins have been completed without incident.”87 
The majority African American Columbia Point was also the site of racial issues. 
Tenants wrote to the BHA that tensions were rising in the development over both housing 
and school desegregation.88 Residents noted that the situation was particularly bad 
because the section of North Dorchester that Columbia Point was in had been tied to their 
historic rivals in majority white South Boston in the busing plan. Making things 
particularly bad for Columbia Point was the development’s location right on the border 
between the two neighborhoods. Tensions boiled over spectacularly during the summers 
of 1975 and 1977 as brawls erupted on Carson Beach. The 1977 incident was 
documented with a front-page article in the Boston Globe with an accompanying picture 
of police separating large groups of beach goers.89 It is hard to say whether or not 
housing desegregation prompted the fighting rather than busing as the Globe article 
states. The beach is located almost directly on the border between South Boston and 
North Dorchester, and it’s almost equidistant between Columbia Point and Mary Ellen 
McCormack. The reporter from the Globe notes that many of the African Americans 
involved were from Columbia Point, but does not similarly include a home neighborhood 
                                                
87 Joseph E. Washington. Interoffice Communication to W Henton-Calhoun. September 28, 1981. 
Fair Housing Task Force Subject File. Boston Housing Authority Archives, Boston City Archives, Boston, 
MA. 
 
88 Major Issues: Columbia Point. Columbia Point Project File. Box Mass. 2-20. Boston Housing 
Authority Archives, Boston City Archives, Boston, MA. 
 
89 Richard Martin. “Blacks, Whites, Hispanics Skirmish at Carson Beach,” Boston Globe, July 25, 
1977. 
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for the white participants, making it hard to pinpoint the exact flashpoint for the fighting. 
It likely could be both housing and school desegregation that caused the fighting. 
The Carson Beach fight points to a larger issue in terms of accounting for housing 
desegregation violence: is it possible to effectively determine what issue caused what 
incident?  Bostonians fighting each other during the 1970s could have had an almost 
infinite number of variations of feelings about support or opposition for housing and 
school desegregation. When a report came into Boston Police of a racial disturbance, 
could it be appropriately attributed to the schools or the public housing? It often was, but 
it is likely that some attributions got lost in the murky feelings Bostonians had towards 
both. There were many incidents attributed to both desegregation efforts, but many anti-
busing incidents were tinted with feelings about housing desegregation and vice versa. 
The Carson brawls are a prime example.  
By 1980, the BHA had taken the steps to create an internal Civil Rights Division, 
partially in an effort to address the racial violence within its developments. In outlining 
the reasoning behind the division’s creation, BHA wrote the following in a 1981 report: 
 
The alarming increase in racial tension and violence within and without BHA 
developments during the summer of 1980 made it evident that we must design 
both short-term and long-range strategies to address fair housing and integration 
goals throughout the Authority.90 
 
What is partially glossed over in the report is that BHA at the time already had fair 
housing and integration goals. However, it is telling that the extent of the violence at 
                                                
90 Boston Housing Authority. Second Semi-Annual Report of the Boston Housing Authority to the 
Suffolk Superior Court, 1980 August 6-1981 February 1. Annual Reports File. Boston Housing Authority 
Archives, Boston City Archives, Boston, MA. 
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BHA properties was such that BHA felt the need not only to create entirely new 
strategies, but also to create an entirely new department within the agency, at least 
partially to address racial tension and violence that the agency itself categorized as 
alarming. 
The one thing that is clear is, if there is one reason Boston’s public housing 
desegregation is not remembered as vividly as school desegregation, it was not lack of 
violence. Tensions between white and black residents were high throughout the 1970s, 
and desegregation efforts only made them higher. Perhaps one could make the argument 
that housing violence was not comparable to busing violence, but that argument gets lost 
in questions of whether or not we can classify “less violence” as “not enough violence to 
matter.” On the one hand, the harassment that happened at McCormack to Faith Evans 
was not exactly the same as what happened during busing protests. But on the other, it 
was clearly violent enough that she moved, as did others in similar situations. Even if we 
make the argument that housing was less violent, it is clear it was at least violent enough 
to have a negative impact on tenants’ behavior.  
One clear difference in violence between busing and public housing desegregation 
is that busing violence enveloped the entire city whereas public housing desegregation 
violence was primarily between BHA tenants. Entire neighborhoods with thousands of 
people were caught up in busing protests. In contrast, the majority of violence over BHA 
desegregation was played out between individual BHA tenants who were most often 
neighbors living in the same development. Although it might be logical to conclude that 
two desegregation efforts during the same time period in the same city would cause 
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residents to have similar reactions, that is clearly not the case. Bostonians do not appear 
to have felt that way at all. What then is the reason for the difference in reaction? 
Citywide, did Bostonians agree with the way BHA implemented desegregation, or 
perhaps, did the general population just not feel any interest towards it at all? The fact 
that there was a violent reaction, but that the violence was isolated primarily among BHA 
tenants seems to suggest that the latter is true.  
 
 
 Chapter 9 
Did the Boston Housing Authority Program Actually Result in Desegregated 
Developments? 
 
 
 The one area where it is easy to judge BHA’s desegregation plans is by examining 
the racial distributions the agency was able to achieve. Quantifying the impact of 
violence or the way programs are implemented can be murky. How much violence is too 
much? How little community involvement is too little? Looking at hard numbers of how 
many white and minority households lived in the various BHA properties, as well as how 
those numbers changed during the agency’s desegregation efforts, is easy by comparison. 
Examining the detailed records BHA maintained should show if the agency was able to 
make the changes that were the agency’s goal. 
 Unfortunately, the initial statistics do not paint a kind picture for the BHA’s 
programs. By the end of the 1970s, only seven BHA properties were deemed what the 
agency labeled as having a “substantial racial mix.”91 The term denoted projects that had  
 
a minority population at least equal proportionately to the proportion of minority 
residents in the city of Boston and [had] a white population of at least 30 percent. 
 
Three developments (West Newton Street, Faneuil, and Washington Street) fell into the 
category, Least Racially Imbalanced, meaning, 
                                                
91 Substantial Racial Mix. Fair Housing Taskforce Subject File. Boston Housing Authority 
Archives, Boston City Archives, Boston, MA. 
 
  49 
 
[D]evelopments which have more than token integration; that is, the white or 
nonwhite population of the development comprises more than 10 percent but less 
than 25 percent of the population of the development.92  
 
The remaining 20, by far the largest group, were all categorized as racially unbalanced 
with white or minority tenants representing 0-10% of the project population.93 Of these, 
12 actually had white or minority populations as low as 1% (see figure 2 below). In this 
regard, it is hard to see what, if any, impacts BHA’s desegregation plans had during this 
period. 
BHA itself openly acknowledged the disheartening situation. Writing in 1981, the 
agency stated in its annual report: 
 
Since dramatic, visible change is hardly to be expected at this early stage, 
we have to look to other, less obvious indicators for evidence of 
progress. And in that, we will find ourselves frustrated.94 
 
In fact, BHA viewed these results so poorly that the agency decided to entirely refocus its 
effort and resources. The attempt to tackle integration at all BHA properties had not 
resulted in success. The BHA turned its focus instead to at least maintaining racial 
diversity at developments that were currently diverse.95 
                                                
92 Least Racially Imbalanced. Fair Housing Taskforce Subject File. Boston Housing Authority 
Archives, Boston City Archives, Boston, MA. 
 
93 Racially Imbalanced. Fair Housing Taskforce Subject File. Boston Housing Authority Archives, 
Boston City Archives, Boston, MA. 
 
94 Boston Housing Authority. Second Semi-Annual Report of the Boston Housing Authority to the 
Suffolk Superior Court, 1980 August 6-1981 February 1. 
 
95 Boston Housing Authority. Second Semi-Annual Report of the Boston Housing Authority to the 
Suffolk Superior Court, 1980 August 6-1981 February 1. 
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The data present a slightly more successful picture for BHA when looking at 
changes to tenant demographics over a longer period of time. An agency report from 
1982 pulled the numbers on ten BHA properties and found that the percentage of 
minority residents in each had gone up.96 The report did include two points of caution 
however: first, because three of the developments had been majority minority to begin 
with (although that at least shows that the refocused effort had worked); and second, 
because two more properties only raised their minority representation slightly. In terms of 
bigger picture trends, however, looking at these numbers, three of the developments 
(Gallivan, South Street, and Washington-Beach) had become clear successes, the general 
trend seemed to be towards more minority inclusion, and at the very least, it would be 
hard to argue that minorities were still being excluded from BHA properties. 
 These two sets of numbers give a slightly cloudier answer than one might get 
from only looking at the overall numbers. Certainly, the majority of BHA properties were 
still heavily segregated even after desegregation plans had been implemented. However, 
the numbers from a handful of projects indicate a trend towards more racial balance 
within the BHA tenant population. It is very possible the trending numbers are indicative 
of a program slowly starting to have success against an entrenched problem that should 
reasonably be expected to take more than five years to fix. It is also very possible that the 
trending numbers just represent outliers and indicate nothing of significance. In 
retrospect, with the benefit of knowing the overall demographic trend within the City of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
96 Non White Population as a Percentage of the Total Population in the Sub Plan Developments. 
June 30, 1982. Fair Housing Taskforce Subject File. Boston Housing Authority Archives, Boston City 
Archives, Boston, MA. 
 
  51 
Boston as the percentage of minority households as risen significantly, it is perhaps 
amazing that BHA was able to achieve any level of positive trend at all.  
There are three problems that the BHA faced in desegregating its housing that 
suggest the agency’s numbers did in fact represent a trend. These problems are all 
particular to housing desegregation and are all semi-related. Taken together, they made 
the BHA’s task at the time incredibly hard, and they illustrate why a few token trends 
might point towards longer-term success. 
The first problem is related to the demographic issues discussed above. The 1949 
Housing Act dictated that housing projects not upset the racial demographics of their 
neighborhoods. For years, when projects were built, they were promptly filled with 
tenants who represented the majority racial group of the neighborhood in which they 
were located. The result was the entrenchment of specific racial communities within 
neighborhood public housing properties. Looking again at the map of Boston’s minority 
and white neighborhoods (Figures 3), and comparing it to the map showing where BHA’s 
properties are (Figure 4), we can see how this happened. Comparing the two illustrates 
how BHA housing could become so segregated as it attempts to mirror the make-up of 
the surrounding community. When the BHA sought to change things during the 1970s, it 
were presented with segregated residents who, although they might support 
desegregation, might not necessarily want to move from their home neighborhood where 
their friends, family, and community were located.  
The second problem the BHA faced was the question of what exactly it meant for 
the agency to be in compliance with HUD’s Fair Housing mandate. It was clear a 
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mandate existed and that compliance was crucial, but whether or not “fair” meant tenants 
had to be given equal access to housing or that housing had to have equal racial 
representation amongst its residents was not explicitly stated by the federal government. 
The seemingly obvious approach BHA could have taken to ensure desegregated 
properties would have been to take the second definition and forcibly move residents 
between developments until racial balances were achieved. The preferential move-in and 
rehabilitation plans BHA ended up using are much more related to the equal opportunity 
approach. The problem with that though is, unlike with forced moves, BHA was at the 
whim of its tenants to integrate. What if tenants simply did not want to move?  
The third problem the BHA was faced with centers on resident behavior towards 
changing neighborhood demographics. In his 1986 study of housing desegregation 
programs, John Yinger found two factors that integration programs generally had to take 
into account to be successful: first, that low-income minorities would be unlikely to 
relocate far away from low-skilled jobs; and second, that whites would generally move 
away from neighborhoods that became majority minority (generally labeled as White 
Flight).97 Failure to consider these points could lead to what Yinger labeled “destabilized 
integration”; either no one would move into a neighborhood or the old population would 
move out out once the new population arrived. Because of these points, Yinger suggested 
that integration programs could either be large or small, but never medium. Small 
programs succeed by identifying white areas unlikely to suffer from flight. Large 
                                                
97 John M. Yinger, “On the Possibility of Achieving Racial Integration through Subsidized 
Housing,” in Housing Desegregation and Federal Policy, ed. John M. Goering (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press,1986), 290-313. 
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programs succeed by not leaving an area open into which white households could flee. 
The problem with medium-sized programs according to Yinger is that white flight is still 
an option. A good desegregation program would begin in targeted receptive white 
communities close to low-skilled jobs, and move on to larger programs once 
desegregation was demonstrated to be effective. With this in mind, the slow pace of BHA 
desegregation does not seem like such a failure. Although Yinger’s study came out after 
the 1970s, it is not unreasonable to think BHA officials understood the benefits of 
starting small and the consequence of destabilization if desegregation went badly.   
 Taken together, these three problems mean that public housing desegregation is 
incredibly difficult: it has to counteract entrenched citywide segregation; it has to 
overcome reluctance to move; and it has to be done in a way that does not destabilize the 
entire process. The BHA had to deal with all three of these problems: Boston housing had 
been segregated for years; BHA programs did not force households to move; and the 
entire undertaking would have been for nothing if minority and white households would 
not both stay in areas the agency attempted to desegregate. With this in mind, the trends 
the BHA reported in 1982 do not look as bleak as the overall numbers, the agency had a 
huge amount of room for improvement, but it should be able to claim at least a partial 
success considering the huge hurdles it faced. 
The fact remains however that desegregation was still a major issue in Boston 
well into the 1980s. In 1982, BHA began again developing new plans, this time by 
creating individual sub-plans for each of its properties. The sub-plans outlined specific 
move-in guidelines. For example, at Archdale,  
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Any departing white household will be replaced with another white household. 
Vacancies created by the departure of nonwhite households will be filled on the 
basis of three white families to one nonwhite family.98  
 
Public housing desegregation was an issue again in 1987 during that year’s mayoral race. 
Ray Flynn, the eventual winner, included a commitment to desegregation in his platform, 
claiming that he would start in his home neighborhood of South Boston. Possibly in a 
reflection of his neighbors’ views on BHA desegregation at the time, although Flynn won 
the mayoral race, he lost his home district. In 1988 and 1998, attempts were again made 
to desegregate BHA properties in South Boston and Charlestown. BHA described the 
effort as happening without incident, but also as slow and token.99 
 Why exactly racial demographics in many of BHA’s properties continued to be a 
problem is unclear. Over time, the Mission, Bromley-Heath, and Columbia Point 
developments all went from predominantly white in the early 1960s to predominantly 
African American. Additionally, Lenox Street, Mission Hill Extension, and Annunciation 
became mostly African American.100 Yinger’s theory of destabilized integration appears 
to apply in these cases; however, it is also a possibility that changing demographics 
within BHA properties were only a reflection of changing demographics impacting the 
entire City of Boston as white households increasingly moved out of the city to the 
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suburbs, leaving minority households to make up a larger percentage of the overall city 
population. As discussed above, the evidence for this being the case is strong. 
 
 
 Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 Boston’s public housing desegregation in the 1970s might not be as vividly 
remembered as busing, and the answer as to why it has been largely invisible is likely not 
just that it lacked the news-making violence or that the effort had a happy ending. 
Instead, it seems that the difference between schools and housing and the reason housing 
desegregation is not remembered as well is because desegregating the city’s projects was 
a much murkier story. Whereas busing presented vivid images of government policy 
gone horribly wrong, and because those images were presented in a way that the public 
could quickly comprehend, public housing desegregation was a much different story. 
 The violence in BHA developments was arguably as impactful as busing violence, 
but it was ultimately very different. Busing riots and protests swept across the city and 
involved large numbers of people. Outside of the Carson Beach incidents, violence 
related to housing desegregation was mostly limited to BHA properties, and tended to 
involve small numbers of the people who lived within those properties fighting with their 
neighbors. That is not to diminish the impact of violence within BHA by saying that it 
was small enough as to be negligible, only to say that it was different. Clearly, violence 
within BHA developments was a major factor impacting tenant’s decisions to move in or 
out of units. 
 The difference in leadership shown within the city and amongst city residents 
with relation to housing and school desegregation is a similar example of a clear 
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difference between the two efforts. Anti-busing demonstrators were led by outspoken 
larger-than-life politicians in giant protest marches. Housing desegregation was led by 
BHA bureaucrats and everyday tenants who wrote each other letters and met in small 
community groups. Again, these groups were as important as their busing counterparts, 
but hardly a flashy story. 
 Perhaps most importantly in muddying the water, the results of the two 
desegregation attempts were different. Busing is still widely considered a colossal failure. 
Public housing’s outcome is slightly different. Although it is hard to determine exactly 
how effective the BHA’s effort was, at the very least the results discussed above show 
some reason for optimism. That probably cannot be said for the school program. 
What ultimately separates public housing and school desegregation is that their 
stories are very different. Despite both taking place in the same city, during the same era, 
with the involvement of the same city government, and dealing with similar city 
resources, they managed to turn out differently in the city’s collective memory. Boston 
busing and the violence that followed have become synonymous with failure, but Boston 
public housing desegregation cannot be described in such stark detail. Instead, what the 
city’s attempt to desegregate its public housing turned out to be is a story about 
government and citizens quietly trying to deal with the problems in their lives to gain 
small amounts of success over issues that can seem insurmountable.  
In light of racial segregation once more becoming an issue for government-
assisted housing via the Houston Housing Authority ruling from the Supreme Court, it is 
worthwhile for decision makers to look back at lessons learned from the efforts of the 
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1970s and 1980s. Because of busing, perhaps the most well-known examples of 
spectacular desegregation program failure, Boston seems like an obvious place to start; 
however, in looking at BHA specifically and comparing it to busing, it is unclear if there 
are any obvious answers for the policy makers of today. Public Housing desegregation in 
Boston was in many ways comparable to busing. It was often violent, and it never 
achieved the racial integration goals that were set. Maybe in that sense, the best piece of 
information BHA’s experience can pass down to the housing authorities of today is that 
they will likely encounter a tough slog through a process that will be contentious and 
long, and that they should prepare accordingly. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Non White Population as a Percentage of the Total Population in the Sub Plan 
Developments101 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Substantial Racial Mix102 
The term “substantial racial mix” means that the development has a minority population 
at least equal proportionately to the proportion of minority residents in the city of Boston 
and has a white population of at least 30 percent. 
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Least Racially Imbalanced103 
The term “Least Racially Imbalanced” refers to developments which have more than 
token integration; that is, the white or nonwhite population of the development comprises 
more than 10 percent but less than 25 percent of the population of the development. 
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Racially Imbalanced104 
The term “Racially Imbalanced” refers to developments in which the population is less 
than 10 percent nonwhite or white. 
 
 % of Nonwhites 
Lenox St. 99 
Orchard Park 99 
Heath St. 99 
Franklin Hill 99 
Mission Ext. 99 
Columbia Pt. 99 
Camden St. 99 
Franklin Field 99 
Whittier St. 98 
Mission Hill 97 
Bromley Park 96 
South End 91 
East Boston 9 
Summer St. 8 
Orient Heights 7 
Fairmount 3 
M. E. McCormack 1 
Old Colony 1 
Broadway 1 
Charlestown 1 
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Figure 3105 
 
 
Racial Demographic Changes in the City of Boston between 1960 and 1970 
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Figure 4 
 
Map of Boston Housing Authority Developments106 
All symbols indicate location of BHA development 
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